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NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This article deals with the role of time in causal models in the social sci-
ences, in contrast to time-free models. More specifically, it aims at taking
time into account in structural causal modeling. For this purpose, the paper
refers to the important discussion on time and causality in the philosophy of
science, and it outlines how time has been taken into account in the practice
of social science research, taking demography and economics as examples.
As a first basic consideration it must be said that taking into account the
role of time in a causal structure is a complex issue. Temporal informa-
tion is useful to the extent that it is placed in a correct causal structure,
and thus further corroborating the causal mechanism or generative process
explaining the phenomenon under consideration. The accepted view in the
social sciences is that causes should precede their outcomes in time. This is
a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for causality. It is important to
note, however, that social science practice has shown that the order in which
variables are observed does not necessarily give the correct causal ordering.
In other words, in many cases, part of the generative or causal process pro-
ducing the outcomes remains latent, as many observed events in the social
sciences result from a decision-making process depending on the intentions,
preferences, expectations, and constraints of the agent or actor. This paper
is concerned with how, in a field such as the social sciences, studying the
generative process underlying the causal relations, requires a thorough re-
flection about time. While we fully acknowledge that the temporal ordering
of the data that are observed cannot provide ipso facto the causal ordering
of variables, we also grant that one cannot escape the fact that causal infer-
ence must rely, for better or worse, on the information available. As pointed
out by John Hicks in his book Causality in Economics (1980), observational
models in the social sciences are embedded in historical time, in contrast to
experimental models in the natural sciences that are usually independent of
historical time. Social facts are tied to time and place, and are partly the
result of the past. In the light of how time can be used in structural models,
our suggestion is to think of the relation between cause and effect more in
terms of a process, of which we try to understand the key points, moments,
actors, etc. This is the main idea behind Structural Causal Modeling in
which `structure' has a meaning that goes beyond `statistical' structure, and
that instead also has to do with `explanation' or with `explanatory mecha-
nisms'. In turn, explanatory mechanisms are those for which it is possible
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to offer a causal ordering of the variables that takes time into account. In
other words, the causal structure is more important than a mere temporal
ordering of the variables. This is because, with due exceptions in which the
temporal order of observations corresponds to the real temporal ordering of
causes and outcomes, plausibility of a causal structure will contribute more
to explaining a phenomenon than the sole temporal ordering of variables as
observed. Temporal information is useful only to the extent that it is placed
in a correct causal structure, and thus further corroborating the mechanism
explaining the phenomenon under consideration. Despite the fact that the
causal ordering of variables is more relevant for explanatory purposes than
the temporal order, the former should nevertheless take into account the
time-patterns of causes and effects, as these are often episodes rather than
events. Most of our behaviours actually extend over a period of time, be they
causes or effects. For this reason in particular, we believe that time should
play a central role in our causal models, more than it has until now.
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Abstract
This article deals with the role of time in causal models in the
social sciences, in particular in structural causal modeling, in con-
trast to time-free models. The aim is to underline the importance of
time-sensitive causal models. For this purpose, it also refers to the
important discussion on time and causality in the philosophy of sci-
ence, and examines how time is taken into account in demography and
in economics as examples of social sciences. Temporal information is
useful to the extent that it is placed in a correct causal structure, and
thus further corroborating the causal mechanism or generative pro-
cess explaining the phenomenon under consideration. Despite the fact
that the causal ordering of variables is more relevant for explanatory
purposes than the temporal order, the former should nevertheless take
into account the time-patterns of causes and effects, as these are often
episodes rather than single events. For this reason in particular, it is
time to put time at the core of our causal models.
Keywords: Time, Causality, Social Sciences, Demography, Economics,
Structural Modeling, Causal Mechanism.
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The mystery of time is ultimately, perhaps, more about
ourselves than about the cosmos. (Carlo Rovelli)
1 Introduction
The above quotation, drawn from Carlo Rovelli's book The Order of Time
(2018), reminds us that time is not only a physical quantity but also a per-
sonal experience. However, the present paper does not deal with the human
experience of time and causality; for this, see for example M.J. Buehner
(2014) and the corresponding special issue of the journal Frontiers in Psy-
chology. Nor do we discuss the very particular relation between time and
causation in physics; on this topic, see e.g.R. Davidson (2013), and more
generally C. Rovelli (op.cit.) on the concept of time.
This article deals instead with the role of time in causal models in the
social sciences, in contrast to time-free models. More specifically, it aims at
taking time into account in structural causal modeling, such as in the frame-
work developed by Russo, Wunsch and Mouchart (2019). For this purpose,
the paper refers to the important discussion on time and causality in the
philosophy of science (e.g.Leuridan and Lodewyckx, 2019), and it outlines
how time has been taken into account in the practice of social science re-
search, taking demography and economics as examples. This paper shows
that taking into account the role of time in a causal structure is a complex
issue.
2 On Time and Causality
2.1 Time
From a philosophical perspective, it is interesting to note that a large part of
the literature aims to establish a relation between time and causality. Causal
relations, unlike correlations, are notoriously asymmetric: X causes Y is not
equivalent to Y causes X, and typically if X causes Y then Y most often
doesn't cause X at the same instant. What is often left implicit in the idea of
causal asymmetry is that causes are temporally prior to their effects. What
is at stake, in fact, is an intricate relation between causation and time, which
has been the object of important contributions from philosophy of science
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and social science methodology. The general strategy, however, has been to
take one as primitive, in order to define the other.
For instance, for some philosophers, if we take the flow of time from past
to present to future as given, the temporal order of variables will correspond
to the causal order. Put in simple terms, this has been the argumentative
strategy of Hans Reichenbach (1956), who was effectively trying to deduce
causal ordering from the probability of observing events in a certain tem-
poral order, from past to present, rather than in the reverse order. In more
recent times, analogue arguments have been offered and revived by Huw Price
(1996), who tried to infer the asymmetry of the cause-effect relation from the
laws of thermodynamics. In the pioneering work of Patrick Suppes (1970),
time ordering of the causes and effects is assumed, and often given by the
conceptual framework used to interpret the data. Thus, while time ordering
of events is mentioned in the definition of `prima facie' cause, it is then left
implicit in the definitions of different types of cause. So, in Suppes' approach
temporal ordering fixes the causal ordering, but within a given conceptual
framework to be specified.
The accepted view in the social sciences is that causes should precede
their outcomes in time. This is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition
for causality. It is important to note, however, that social science practice has
shown that the order in which variables are observed does not necessarily give
the correct causal ordering. For example, a change in occupation might follow
a change in residence but the latent decision to change one's occupation might
precede the decision to migrate. In other words, in many cases, part of the
generative or causal process producing the outcomes remains latent, as many
observed events in the social sciences result from a decision-making process
depending on the intentions, preferences, expectations, and constraints of
the agent or actor. These factors may moreover vary over time. In some
situations, such as in the case of divorce, the decision is taken by more
than one agent. This compounds the difficulty of correctly specifying the
latent decision-making process leading to the observed event. Possible non-
observability of some of the variables is a major problem in the development
of relevant structural models.
Of course, retrospective questions can to some extent inform us on the
decision-making process, but the answers are often influenced by recall lapses
and by motivated reasoning, i.e. producing justifications that are most de-
sired instead of the actual argument. For example, an agent might declare
that his/her change in occupation was the result of free choice, though in
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fact (s)he was forced to leave his/her former job. One adapts the evidence
to justify one's behavior.
Recall lapses are not the only problem in the timing of events. If official
registers record births or deaths, for example, according to the day of occur-
rence, dating can be more imprecise in other sources. For example, in the
Belgian Health Interview Survey of 2013, questions on stress and wellbeing
relate to the past weeks, with no precise date. In innumerate populations, age
itself is often poorly recorded in censuses or surveys, leading to age heaping
in population pyramids. In economics, some econometric indicators such as
growth rate or inflation are usually recorded at quarterly or monthly scales.
Temporal ordering may thus prove problematic for causal ordering. One must
clearly distinguish the generative or causal process underlying the ordering
of cause-effect relations from the manifestation of this process producing the
(possibly inaccurate and incomplete) temporal data that are actually ob-
served. In other words, as stressed a long time ago by Blalock (1968) and
more recently Gérard (2006), one must distinguish the conceptual model at
the theoretical level from the operational model at the observational level.
In many situations, due to lack of data, some of the concepts in the former
model cannot be translated into relevant measurable indicators in the lat-
ter model. For instance, the whole debate about time series and spurious
correlations, see e.g.Reiss (2006), was meant to show that even the cleanest
temporal sequence cannot be taken as a foolproof basis for causality.
This paper is concerned with how, in a field such as the social sciences,
studying the generative process underlying the causal relations, requires a
thorough reflection about time. While we fully acknowledge that the tem-
poral ordering of the data that are observed cannot provide ipso facto the
causal ordering of variables, we also grant that one cannot escape the fact
that causal inference must rely, for better or worse, on the information avail-
able. In the perspective of causal assessment, a thorough evaluation of the
quality and relevance of the information at hand must always be performed.
In the structural causal modeling perspective of this paper, the terms gener-
ative process and causal mechanism are used interchangeably for the ordered
network of cause-outcome relations. We adopt here the characterization of
`minimal mechanism' of Glennan and Illari (2017, p.92), because it is broad
and liberal enough to include both these terms as well as `causal process':
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose
activities and interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phe-
nomenon.
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For our purposes, the possible differences between these three terms do
not matter. What does count is that, in all cases, there is an important
temporal dimension that poses theoretical and practical challenges.
This overview on time and its relation to causality shows that the goal in
philosophy is often to use one to define the other, as if one should have pri-
ority. Such priority may be understood in metaphysical or epistemic terms.
For instance, one may argue that the arrow of time is metaphysically prior,
and this gives us the arrow of causality. Or, one could consider the flow of
time as an `epistemic' tool to make inferences about causal ordering. How-
ever, the following sections show that, in the practice of the social sciences,
and notably of economics, reasoning about temporal and causal ordering is
not fixed. Or, differently put, the question at stake is not to determine, once
and for all, whether temporal priority defines causal priority or vice-versa.
Instead, the question is how best to use temporal knowledge, when available,
to make causal inference and vice-versa. In other words, what emerges from
the practice of the social sciences, is a kind of pragmatic approach to the role
of time in causality. Indeed, one can sometimes infer causality from cross-
sectional data, where temporal information is not reflected in the observed
values of the variables. Here, time can be encoded using background and
contextual knowledge (Wunsch, Russo, Mouchart, 2010).
One can distinguish, from practice in demographic research (Section 3),
three main aspects of time, developed in the following paragraph. In a
broader perspective, one could also consider other aspects of time, for ex-
ample `natural' time such as the cycle of the seasons and its relation with
agricultural production (see Section 4), or the seasonal cycle of religious rules
and practices and its impact on the occurrence of marriages and conceptions
(Matsuo and Matthijs, 2018). Biological cycles are other examples of `nat-
ural' time. For instance, fecundability (the probability of conceiving) varies
greatly across the menstrual cycle. Or one can be interested in `social' time,
such as work time, life stages, etc. On this topic, and its relation to natu-
ral and individual time, see the interesting paper by van Tienoven (2019).
Sequence analysis can be used in this case to examine, for example, the se-
quential patterns of housing trajectories (Mikolai and Kulu, 2019). Courgeau
(2018) has thoroughly discussed the pros and cons of this approach, in com-
parison with event-history analysis and network analysis.
Consider now three main aspects of time as derived from demographic
practice. Firstly, time is at the basis of the ordering of events, such as a
change in occupation followed by a change in residence. In the social sci-
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ences, as pointed out above, the temporal priority of the cause over the
outcome (the happens-before relation), with an appropriate time-lag, is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for causality. Following the Russo -
Williamson thesis (Gillies, 2011), one also needs in addition that the cause
make a difference to the outcome. Furthermore, the observed temporal order
does not necessarily correspond to the causal order, for reasons given above.
Secondly, the passage of time is associated with the ageing and decline of
biological organisms, such as human beings, or the wearing out of manmade
objects, such as your car. Thirdly, and more specifically for the social sci-
ences and humanities, history is entrenched in time. Events, such as `Black
Tuesday' (October 29, 1929) and the stock market crash, and institutions,
such as the Central Bank and its activities, are specific to a historical time
and context. The latter have to be taken into account in causal assessment.
As pointed out by John Hicks in his book Causality in Economics (1980),
observational models in the social sciences are embedded in historical time,
in contrast to experimental models in the natural sciences that are usually
independent of historical time. Social facts are tied to time and place, and
are partly the result of the past. This explains, for example, why most
time-series in the social sciences are non-stationary, and why causal models
in the social sciences are time- and context-dependent, and are specific to
a reference population that has to be circumscribed (Russo, Wunsch and
Mouchart, 2019).
Sections 3 and 4 will shed some light on these various aspects of time
and their relation to causal processes, focusing in particular on two specific
disciplines within the social sciences, demography (Section 3) and economics
(section 4). In demography, the three main aspects of time considered above
are at the very basis of causality assessment, while in economics concepts
such as rationality of the economic agents or opportunity cost, are usually
considered independent of historical time. Theories and models in economics
would thus be closer, to some extent, to those in the natural sciences than to
the theories and models developed in demography or in anthropology, to give
another example. The issue of time is, of course, also addressed in the other
social sciences, such as sociology. See, in particular, the literature review on
the sociology of time in Bergmann (1992).
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2.2 Causality
The concept of causality is also much discussed in philosophy and in science.
There is no unanimous definition of causality able to capture the meaning
and use of the concept across different scientific domains. While, philosoph-
ically speaking, pluralist approaches such as the one developed by Illari and
Russo (2014 ) are gaining traction and eventually prove a useful approach, we
confine the discussion here to some specific uses of `cause', `causality', `cau-
sation', from the literature on causal modeling in quantitative social science
research.
In the context of quantitative modeling, causality has to do, prima facie,
with how variables are correlated. These models often follow the `causation
via association approach', as D.R. Cox (1992) has called it, i.e. a variable
X is a plausible cause of another variable Y if the dependence between the
two cannot be eliminated by introducing additional variables in the analysis.
The general question behind different modeling practices is how changes in
the putative cause X are related to changes in the putative effect(s) Y, and
what would possibly ground such correlation (Russo, 2009). Asking what
`would possibly ground a correlation' amounts to answering `explanation-
seeking why-questions' (dixit Carl Hempel). For this purpose, one needs to
go beyond the `causation as robust dependence' approach in favor of what H.-
P. Blossfeld (2009) has coined a `causation as generative process' approach.
One should characterize the properties of the underlying data generating
process, i.e. the mechanism behind the data.
For this reason, causal assessment is based, in the present paper, on struc-
tural causal modeling (SCM), the characteristics of which are the following
(Russo, Wunsch and Mouchart, 2019). Firstly, a recursive decomposition of
the joint distribution of the variables, based on an ordered sequence of intel-
ligible sub-mechanisms (entities and activities), reflecting the causal ordering
of the variables underlying the putative mechanism generating the data. Each
of the sub-mechanisms is time-dependent, as causes precede their effects in
time. Secondly, congruence with background knowledge, concerning the con-
text and period, the causal ordering and the role-function of the variables.
Thirdly, invariance of the recursive decomposition for a specified population
and historical context.
Though SCM focuses on the individual level, agents/actors are of course
part of social networks of interacting individuals, and are influenced by
higher-level units of analysis. A causal explanation should also take these
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multilevel interrelations into account. For example, scientists collaborate
with others, and these networks are embedded in disciplinary and organiza-
tional levels. This relational structure of scientific collaboration plays a role
in the scholars' success, i.e. the funding they receive (Bellotti et al., 2016).
In the context of econometrics, causality has sometimes been understood
in a rather different way. Take, for example, the so-called Granger-causality
in econometrics. Actually, Granger-causality does not correspond to a classic
definition of causality (see e.g.Little (2011) from a causal realist perspective)
but to a concept of `self-predictivity', in the sense of sufficiency for prediction
(Florens, Mouchart and Rolin 1990, p.255). Granger-causality refers in fact
to a concept of non-causality: X does not cause Y if the earlier values of
X have no impact on the later values of Y. Therefore, it does not describe
a structural cause and effect relationship. Following is another example of
a view on causality that differs from the generative process approach. In
Big Data-driven analysis using data mining techniques, Big Data being char-
acterized both by many data and many variables, causality usually means
uncovering hidden associations or statistical dependencies among variables.
These can serve for descriptive purposes, for finding unsuspected patterns
in the data that may possibly lead to discovering novel mechanisms, or for
automatic detection in the data of outcomes of known causes. The focus is
always on extracting strong relationships or patterns among variables from
the data. See Hassani, Huang, and Ghodsi (2018) for a thorough overview of
data mining techniques applied to Big Data analysis. While this approach
is rather widespread, Big Data analyses could also be carried out in a struc-
tural causal modeling perspective, but this issue lies outside the scope of the
present paper.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 examines the
reference to the three main aspects of time in demographic research, as an
example of a social science dealing with time. As another example, Section
4 is devoted to the role of time in economic theories and models. Section 5
examines, in a generative process perspective, how time can be incorporated
into structural causal models, considering among others that causes and out-
comes can be events or episodes. It points out some practical difficulties
in integrating time in structural causal models. Finally, Section 6 concludes
that the causal ordering of variables is more relevant for explanatory purposes
than the temporal ordering.
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3 Time and Causality in Demography
For a broader perspective on demography, the reader is referred to Daniel
Courgeau (2007) who has thoroughly examined the change in the paradigms
of demographic research, from the macro to the micro level, and then to
multilevel analysis. Frans Willekens has also been a pioneer in building a
bridge between the micro and macro levels with his MicMac demographic
models (Willekens, 2005).
Since its origin in the 17th century, demography as a science has been
concerned with time. One of its founding fathers, John Graunt, was in-
strumental in computing the first life table taking broad age-intervals into
account (Graunt, 1662), based upon the Bills of Mortality, i.e. weekly data
on burials in London. Actually, the Bills did not record age at death. The
age-intervals used by Graunt are largely conjectural. For a recent overview
of Graunt's achievements, see Harkness (2020). Age is, of course, the time
elapsed since birth and it is a crucial factor associated with the risk of dying,
as frailty usually increases with ageing. A recent example is the age-effect
in the risk of dying from COVID-19. The mean age at death, also called
the expectation of life at birth, is a convenient summary indicator of the life
table. Life tables by age (and sex) became one of the main tools in the de-
mographic arsenal, and the framework was eventually adapted to the study
of fertility by age, among others. As one knows, age is an important factor
associated with fertility too. From the age-specific fertility rates, one can
derive in particular the mean age at childbearing and the average number
of children per woman. Usually, these tables were computed for a specific
period, e.g.for the study of mortality or fertility by age in the period 1980-84
for example, using the so-called fictitious (or synthetic) cohort approach (see
Wunsch and Termote, 1978). Time trends could then be examined period
by period, and discussed in a causal perspective by taking into account the
historical contexts of the periods considered.
With the increasing availability of long series of vital statistics, and thanks
to the impetus given by such demographers as Norman Ryder in the US or
Louis Henry in France, the focus of analysis gradually changed from period to
cohort. The latter stands for a group of persons experiencing the same event-
origin (birth, marriage, occurrence of the third child, etc.) during the same
year or time-period. As Ryder (1965, p. 844) has pointed out, each cohort has
a unique location in the stream of history. Thus, each cohort is differentiated
from all others. Fertility rates, for example, were now examined by birth
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cohort and age; divorce was studied by marriage cohort according to the time
passed since marriage, the probability of having a fourth child computed by
parity cohort according to the duration elapsed since the birth of the third
child, etc., and cohort- and duration-effects were often highlighted. In all
these cases, duration is measured according to some arbitrary units of time,
such as year, month, etc., that act as points of reference. The choice of the
unit has an impact on the analysis of durations. The data and indicators
remain however at the aggregate level, as vital statistics are not published
at the individual level. A useful visual device for presenting results by age,
period, and cohort, dating from the end of the 19th century, has been the so-
called Lexis diagram (see Vandeschrick, 2001). Of course, the three variables
are linearly related. Without further constraints, the separate influence of
each of these three variables (age, period, cohort) cannot be identified.
With the advent of computers, a further step could now be taken: the
analysis of longitudinal individual data, as provided by retrospective ques-
tions at censuses and especially at surveys. A major advantage of longitudi-
nal individual data is that it enables the temporal ordering of possible causes
and outcomes. To give an example in the field of fertility, Laurent Toulemon
(2006) has studied the relation between age at first birth and number of chil-
dren born, using the individual data provided by the French Family History
Survey of 1999, taking in particular into account the woman's year of birth
and her level of education. He has then compared his individual-level results
to the macro situations and trends among the European countries and the
US. Toulemon shows that at the micro level the number of children born per
woman in France does depend on the age at first birth, even when educa-
tional level is controlled. The relation is not observed however at the country
or macro level in an international comparison, and it varies across cohorts
and time. Of course, temporal order does not necessarily imply causal order,
though causes must precede their effects in time. From a survey on migra-
tion histories, for example, one can see if a change in residence has followed a
change in occupation, or vice-versa, though - as previously discussed - surveys
rarely record the decision-making process that has led to these events.
Demographers can also adopt a life course approach, when studying the
timing, i.e. the ordering, of successive births during one's childbearing pe-
riod or the series of changes of residence one has made during one's lifetime.
For an interesting presentation of the life course approach, stressing in par-
ticular the interdependencies across time, domains, and levels, see Bernardi,
Huinink and Settersten (2019). One can relate individual fertility or mi-
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gration, or more generally individual behavior, to one's socio-economic and
cultural characteristics and contexts, and their interdependencies, such as
ethnicity, social background, childhood experiences, educational level, and
to the social transitions and sequences of events experienced during one's life
span. The choice of these explanatory variables is of course dependent upon
the time-period and context one is considering, i.e. the historical time during
which the events are occurring. For example, the determinants of fertility in
high-fertility Niger are substantially different from those in low-fertility Ger-
many. Furthermore, the approach is quite demanding in terms of relevant
data, both micro and macro, their interrelations, and their change over time.
Another problem is the great heterogeneity in life courses, often requiring the
use of dimensionality-reduction methods, such as latent class growth models,
as the number of individuals is usually small but the number of variables is
large.
Obviously, the retrospective approach is not suited for the analysis of
mortality: dead men tell no tales, as the saying goes! More or less at
the same time however, epidemiologists could study morbidity and mortality
using individual prospective data, such as those provided by the Framingham
Heart Study (from 1950 onwards). Prospective follow-up birth-cohort studies
are currently used in demography to examine for example child development
over time. Field sites or population laboratories in the developing countries,
such as the Matlab project established in 1966 in Bangladesh, have also
yielded individual longitudinal data for the study of i.a mortality trends and
patterns (Razzaque et al., 2009). Demographers have furthermore benefitted
from the development of statistical methods for the analysis of longitudinal
data, such as the Cox proportional hazards model and other survival models
for event history analysis (see e.g.Florens, Fougère and Mouchart, 2008).
A more recent development has been the spread of record linkage among
data sources, with the adoption of a common personal identification number
(PIN) in the various sources. As discussed in Wunsch and Gourbin (2018),
the same individual may, for example, be interviewed in a health survey
and later on recorded in a cancer register, with information collected by
the health insurance system and medical statistics, and end up with his/her
cause of death specified on a death certificate and a possible autopsy report.
Being able to link these individual records together over time, thanks to
a PIN, can give the event history or biography of the person in the areas
of health, morbidity and mortality. If the observation period is sufficiently
long, one can, for example, examine the shift from good health to ill health,
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then to chronic disease, disability and finally death. Owing to currently
available registers in several countries, one can also take into account various
socio-economic characteristics of the individuals (such as employment), some
aspects of their behavior (such as the consumption of medicinal drugs), and
their change over time. This linked information can possibly be used to
develop relevant structural causal models in the health field. Demographers
are currently linking census data with vital statistics for mortality studies,
and the Nordic countries among others are using linked registers for the study
of health and disease. For example, Oksuzyan et al. (2009) have linked three
Danish population-based surveys to three national registers to examine the
health-survival paradox, i.e. the fact that women live longer than men, but
men often report better health than women. With the powerful computers
now available, the record linkage issue is not technical but ethical: how do
we guarantee the privacy and absence of disclosure of the data while at the
same time using them for scientific purposes?
4 Time and Causality in Economics
Very often, in the social sciences, we cannot obtain a complete knowledge
of how decisions are formed, since we do not have a thorough and detailed
information on the functioning of the system itself and on the context in
which the decisions are made. In the analysis of social phenomena, we then
proceed by models. Their purpose is to provide a useful construct that allows
us to interpret the phenomena of the real world according to a hypotheti-
cal structure suggested by theory, and in this interpretation time can play
a fundamental role. More generally, regarding the importance of time in
economics, the reader is referred, for instance, to two issues of the journal
Oeconomia (2017, issues 7- 1 and 7-2).
Time is the dimension in which the passing of events is conceived and
measured. It is basically a human construct designed for organization and
coordination purposes, and it induces the distinction between past, present,
and future. The time factor cannot be ignored if we want to highlight the
relevance of the evolutionary aspects of an economic process. For economic
time series data, time is unidirectional by construction, since its direction is
defined as that of increasing time. In economics, time is quite different from
the spatial dimension where we can move spatially back and forth, while
there is no time reversibility for empirical observations of time series of eco-
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nomic data. And it is precisely because we can count on the directionality
of time in economic time series that it is possible to consider time as a ve-
hicle of causality, for those phenomena for which the causal relationship is
supported by economic theory. Taking time into account in economics has
given rise to an interesting debate which has resulted in a series of proposals
in the various areas of economics, from macroeconomics to microeconomics,
both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. A first important
result of this debate was to ascertain that time preferences may vary ac-
cording to socio-economic status, culture, and levels of development, with
the consequences that this entails on the inter-temporal choices of individ-
uals. Another important result is in the area of economic theory dealing
with choices in conditions of uncertainty based on expected utility. In this
case, the matter of time consistency has brought about an interesting discus-
sion leading to a more descriptively accurate and psychologically grounded
representation of time.
The concept of interest rate, which differs according to whether it is
defined in the short term or in the long term, implicitly attributes the reason
for this difference to the time factor. In fact, time takes on the power to
change the value of money according to the so-called discounted cash flow
(Kruschwitz and Loeer, 2005). Moreover, modern economic theories have
introduced the concept of time-based competition (Stalk and Thomas, 1990),
a kind of strategic game on the markets where the one who arrives first
wins. In financial markets, the measurement of the volatility of financial
time-series is an important element that is considered for the evaluation and
analysis of financial risk. In performing risk management, it is necessary to
have a good understanding of how volatility changes over time. The usual
approaches to the study of this phenomenon are mainly based on physical
time as a persistent measurement of the intervals at which price returns
are calculated. These are observed in a price time-series showing variations
ranging from minutes to hourly, daily or weekly changes, in which the flow of
time is discontinuous. Because of this, it is difficult and inefficient to observe
price changes through the use of physical time, since significant patterns of
trading risk may be ignored when considering data based on physical time
(e.g.weekly, daily, or hourly changes). The importance of trading activity
actually depends on the time of the day and on the day of the week (i.e. on
a precise instant of time), and physical time fails to represent the full activity
of price variations. This is typically a problem of time-aggregation, discussed
more fully in Wunsch, Mouchart and Russo (2018). Moreover the time-
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aggregation for a causal event may be different from the time-aggregation for
an outcome event.
For many economic phenomena, the observed data are obtained by ap-
plying temporal aggregation to the original processes, and this can make it
difficult to discover the underlying causal relationships. For example, some
econometric indicators, such as growth rate or inflation, are usually recorded
at quarterly or monthly scales. Causal interactions between financial assets,
however, may take place at weekly or fortnightly scales. One should how-
ever note, in the financial field, that the BEDOFIH database collects stock
market data in nearly real time (see Eurofidai website). We can say that
there is an optimal time frequency for analyzing economic data, that is, the
frequency that allows us to grasp in the best possible way the causal rela-
tionships underlying the phenomenon under study. Thus, for the analysis
of financial markets it is necessary to have high frequency data, as decisions
on these markets are made very quickly. For the analysis of other economic
phenomena, data can be used instead at a lower frequency, as decisions are
made in more extended times.
Another important role of the time factor in economics is given by the
principle called the time value of money. It is based on the assumption that
rational investors prefer to receive money today rather than the same amount
of money in the future, due to the money's potential growth in value over
a given period of time. Given that money can earn compound interest, it
is more valuable in the present rather than the future. The time value of
money is simply given by the basic, or risk free, interest rate. As a general
rule, money does not reduce its value unless inflation occurs. Due to the
fact that money has the characteristic of usually not losing value, interest is
required when it is lent.
This rule lays the foundation for determining the discount rate that should
be expected for future cash flows. The same principle, considered mainly
for financial assets, is also used to calculate the depreciation of other types
of assets. On the basis of this methodology, the intrinsic value of a good
is determined, i.e. the value of owning that good for its entire duration.
Every product loses its value over time. For example, no one will want
to buy yesterday's newspaper today, as perishable products will deteriorate
increasingly and therefore lose value with the passage of time. The monetary
value of an asset decreases over time due to use, usury, or obsolescence or,
ultimately, to unfavorable market conditions. The duration during which the
value of a product depreciates is measured by time.
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The fact that the variance of asset returns tends to change over time
greatly complicates the analysis. Methods based on stochastic volatility have
been developed in the statistical sphere, while other methods designed to
evaluate the size of the volatility are mostly based on Fourier analysis and
involve considerable computing. To overcome the difficulties of estimating
volatility, there is a need to develop new methods able to describe the evo-
lutionary dynamics of the series of prices regardless of price flow over time.
Alternative methods have been proposed in the literature and among them
a reliable solution is provided by the method based on the use of intrin-
sic time. Intrinsic time consists in the rescaling of the data, especially the
high frequency ones in the financial sector, which - instead of being reported
according to calendar time (by day, week, month, quarter etc.) - are ex-
pressed in a time dimension that has the aim of capturing the core of the
phenomenon (Muller et al., 1993). This new time dimension transforms time
in accordance with the intrinsic characteristics of the system being analyzed,
providing data with a higher frequency during turbulent periods and a lower
frequency during periods of calm. The series of data represented in this way is
much more informative on the volatility (risk) of the phenomenon, unlike the
series observed according to the standard calendar which, by construction,
are unable to capture this type of information.
As seen before, the physical time method is based on a fixed interval point
system. Intrinsic time is based on an event system, i.e. the time interval is
defined by events. Consequently, while physical time is homogenous, since
observations are equally spaced on any chosen time scale, intrinsic time is
not homogenous in time. The observation takes place only when the event
occurs, independently of the notion of physical time. To define an event ac-
cording to the system of intrinsic time, a threshold is fixed and any change in
price between two local extreme values exceeding this threshold identifies an
event. This change in price may be downwards or upwards, and the notion of
directional change has been introduced in the literature (Aloud et al., 2012).
The intrinsic time concept and related directional change have no relation
with the speed of price change. The characteristic of directional change of
intrinsic time sets the foundations for a new variance estimator completely
detached from time series data observed in equidistant time-periods. Direc-
tional change events, both upward and downward, tend to highlight signifi-
cant periodic changes in the time-series where the magnitude of an event is
decided by the researcher. In a completely different way, in physical time,
one divides time into periods of equal length, giving rise to the possibility
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of omitting significant events. With intrinsic time, the significant events are
highlighted, showing a temporal evolution of prices that is useful for eval-
uating the dynamic behavior of a financial market and the analysis of the
volatility of financial time-series.
These considerations point out the importance of the time factor in eco-
nomics and its diversified use, but they do not clearly highlight the impor-
tance of time for causal assessment. Considering that a main concern of
economics is to understand the functioning of the economy, of what is ob-
served day by day, and the functioning of the mechanisms of an economic
system, then the concept of time as a background to causal relationships is
somehow recovered. However, due to a lack of a detailed knowledge of how
the economic world works, and of the functioning of economic mechanisms,
economics, like many other disciplines, makes use of theory and models that
should help in describing the economic mechanisms. Referring to theory
means providing a putative explanation of the phenomenon, i.e. propos-
ing a causal mechanism that contributes to a plausible understanding of the
observed reality.
In economics, time is also used to describe the seasonality of certain phe-
nomena. Seasonality is a phenomenon linked to time, which occurs within one
year and is caused by changes in weather, and in the calendar and timing of
decisions. In agriculture, for example, the seasonality of crop production en-
tails complications in the economic decisions of the producer. In agriculture,
investments are made well in advance of production, the latter being uncer-
tain in quantity and quality, as the agricultural production cycle depends
considerably on rainfall and more generally on weather conditions which are
not foreseeable so far in advance, i.e. when making decisions about which
crops to plant. In other words, farmers have to face long delays between the
time they spend and their revenue, which also makes access to credit diffi-
cult. All this has as a consequence that the realizations and expectations on
the prices of agricultural products are uncertain and vary over time, as they
depend in an important way on weather trends and on seasonality. In addi-
tion, farmers must devote their time to multiple activities distributed over
time and according to a temporal schedule that cannot be modified. The
preparation of the soil must take place before seeding which follows the use
of fertilizers or other treatments, activities that take place before the harvest,
followed by the subsequent processing of the product. This temporal sched-
ule is given by the nature of the phenomenon. It follows that when farmers
have to cope with anomalous seasonal trends, these anomalies will have to be
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absorbed in the context of their work organization with appropriate adap-
tations. Despite this, due to the long delays between action and results,
farmers will never be able to eliminate the risk of temporal inconsistencies
in decisions that may have an impact on productivity and income.
Therefore, always with reference to time in agriculture, an important
aspect regards the delays and the mismatches in the various stages of the
production process. For example, a delay in seeding due to adverse weather
conditions can compromise the production and harvest of the whole year.
In fact, the seeding times cannot be extended beyond a certain period, and
therefore the interventions that must be carried out before seeding risk not
being able to be carried out, with serious consequences on the production
cycle and on the results of the entire harvest. In developing economies, the
time pattern of the agricultural cycle entails a cycle in sales and consequently
in the nutrition of the local population, because there is often no possibility
of product storage. This leads to a high sale at the time of the harvest
at low prices, while in subsequent periods prices increase and consumption
decreases. Thus, a seasonality in consumption is observed which in turn
induces a seasonality in the nutritional intake of the resident population.
It is an open problem to understand how farmers can cope with seasonal
crop fluctuations in developing countries. It is quite evident that these phe-
nomena push local populations to abandon their native places and move to
other areas where they hope to improve their living conditions. The study of
these phenomena requires being able to have data on a seasonal basis rather
than on an annual basis. Ultimately, seasonality and temporal uncertainty
make economic decisions in agriculture more difficult than, for example, in
the industrial sector.
5 Time in Structural Causal Modeling
As pointed out in Section 2, in this paper causality is assessed in a structural
modeling perspective. This section examines some specific problems when
analyzing the role of time in structural causal modeling and should be viewed
as complementary to the preceding sections where other approaches are also
considered.
As summarized in Section 2.2, this approach is based on a recursive de-
composition of the joint distribution of the variables, interpretable as an
ordered sequence of intelligible sub-mechanisms (entities and activities), re-
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flecting a causal ordering of the variables underlying the putative mechanism
generating the data. In this framework, time is implicit in the causal order-
ing of the variables reflecting the underlying mechanism and sub-mechanisms.
The decomposition can be represented by a directed acyclic graph or DAG
(Pearl, 2000), though a DAG cannot embody all aspects of the causal struc-
ture among variables. In other words, in the present framework, a DAG
represents the conditioning structure of a joint distribution, underlying a re-
cursive decomposition, but does not fully provide the properties of the con-
ditional distributions and, therefore, exhibits the mechanisms only partially.
The recursive decomposition is based on background knowledge, including
the historical context and period, the causal ordering and the role-function
of the variables. Finally, considering as structural a mechanism underly-
ing the workings of a data generating process requires that the model enjoy
suitable properties of stability, or invariance, under a `reasonable' class of
interventions and of modifications of the environment, i.e. relatively to an
underlying population of reference. Indeed, a model that would be different
for, say, each observation should not be considered as structural.
Once the vector of variables X is decomposed into an ordered sequence
of p components, namely X = (X1, X2, · · ·Xp) (with p typically much larger
than 2), a recursive decomposition is a systematic marginal-conditional de-
composition of the joint distribution of X, namely:
pX(x | θ) = pXp|X1,X2,···Xp−1(xp | x1, x2, · · ·xp−1, θp|1,···p−1)
· pXp−1|X1,X2,···Xp−2(xp−1 | x1, x2, · · · xp−2, θp−1|1,···p−2) · · ·
· pXj |X1,X2,···Xj−1(xj | x1, x2, · · · xj−1, θj|1,···j−1) · · · pX1(x1 | θ1)
(1)
where each θj|1,···j−1 stands for the parameters characterizing the correspond-
ing conditional distribution pXj |X1,X2,···Xj−1 . For more details, see Mouchart,
Russo and Wunsch (2010).
The purpose of this section is to examine how various aspects of time can
be taken into account in structural causal modeling. In particular, a cause or
an outcome can be considered as an event, such as a change in occupation at
time t leading to a change in residence at time t+k (k>0). But a cause or an
outcome can also be an episode spread over a period of time t to t+n, for in-
stance an unhealthy diet leading to the progressive development of atheroscle-
rosis. In structural modeling, this issue does not seem to be much discussed
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but there are exceptions in epidemiology, such as marginal structural models
with time-dependent treatments and time-dependent confounders, or models
taking into account time-dependent treatments and moderators.
In demography, three time-effects have been distinguished, corresponding
to three main aspects of time outlined in Section 2: duration effects, period
effects, and cohort effects. For example, an age-specific risk of dying is de-
pendent upon age (the more one ages, the higher the risk), upon the period
(there are good and bad years for the flue), and upon the cohort (due to co-
hort selection effects over time). Compared with demography, in economics
- particularly in the financial environment - the role of time may be quite
heterogenous not only among the financial agents but also in historical time.
This puts into perspective the distinction drawn in Section 4 between phys-
ical and intrinsic time. Furthermore, as stressed in particular by Kelly and
McGrath (1988), causes and outcomes can present temporal features that
should be taken into account. For example, the cause and outcome processes
can have different temporal shapes (e.g.linear, delayed, cyclical, etc.) that
have to be considered in the causal model.
A first problem to be considered is the feedback effect. It was said in
Section 2 that if X causes Y , Y does not cause X. If time is taken into
account, and if a suitable mechanism is put forward, this restriction can be
waived: X causes Y during a first period of time and Y causes X during a
second period of time. More formally, a feedback effect may be represented
by the following DAG under further conditions:
Xt1 → Yt2 → Xt3 Xt3⊥Xt1 | Yt2 t1 < t2 < t3 (2)
with the corresponding recursive decomposition:
pXt1 ,Yt2 ,Xt3 = pXt1 · pYt2 |Xt1 · pXt3 |Yt2 (3)
The differences t3 − t2 and t2 − t1 represent the time-lags between the oc-
curence of the cause and that of the effect. For the sake of simplification, the
parameters have not been explicitly written in the previous equation. This
example shows that it is necessary to specify time information about the
working of the mechanism. In some cases, and following also Suppes (1970),
time information is provided by background knowledge or available theories,
and structural modeling can, in such cases, avoid explicit specification of
time parameters.
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A second problem to be considered deals with the causal DAG X → Y
where X is a function of time between t1 and t2 and where Y is a function of
time between t3 and t4, with t1 < t2 < t3 < t4. The corresponding recursive
decomposition can then be written:
pXt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt3 ,Yt4 = pXt1 · pXt2 |Xt1 · pYt3 |Xt1 ,Xt2 · pYt4 |Xt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt3 (4)
along with
Yt3⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt2 −Xt1 Yt4⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt2 −Xt1 , Yt3 (5)
These two equations (4) and (5) represent different cases which have to be
made more explicit in specific situations. For instance, the variables Xt
and/or Yt may change progressively within the intervals [t1, t2] or [t3, t4] or
may have an evolution in time with an abrupt change between t1 and t2 or
between t3 and t4 (see Blossfeld, 2009).
In some situations, variable Yt could start changing at the same time as
the end of the change in Xt . In this case, one would have: t1 < t2 < t3 with:
pXt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt2 ,Yt3 = pXt1 · pXt2 |Xt1 · pYt2 |Xt1 ,Xt2 · pYt3 |Xt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt2 (6)
along with
Yt2⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt2 −Xt1 Yt3⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt2 −Xt1 , Yt2 (7)
In another situation, Yt could start changing before the end of the change
in Xt, e.g.a change in atherosclerosis linked to a change in diet. In this case,
one would still have: t1 < t2 < t3 < t4 but with:
pXt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt2 ,Xt3 ,Yt4 = pXt1 ·pXt2 |Xt1 ·pYt2 |Xt1 ,Xt2 ·pXt3 |Xt1 ,Xt2 ,Yt2 ·pYt4 |Xt1 ,Xt2 ,Xt3 ,Yt2
(8)
This situation is more complex. If a feedback mechanism is excluded, one
can assume:
Xt3⊥ Yt2 | Xt1 , Xt2 (9)
Similarly to the previous cases, one can also assume:
Yt2⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt2 −Xt1 Yt4⊥Xt1 , Xt2 | Xt3 −Xt1 , Yt2 , Xt3 (10)
In all the above models, it is assumed that the time points are given
and known, and that there are no exogenous variables acting as confounders.
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The previous discussion shows that incorporating time in a causal model
may raise difficult modeling issues, especially when there are many time-
dependent variables.
The econometric literature also considers time-dependent autoregressive
models of the type:
Xt1 → Xt2 → Xt3 Xt3⊥Xt1 | Xt2 t1 < t2 < t3 (11)
with the corresponding recursive decomposition:
pXt1 ,Xt2 ,Xt3 = pXt1 · pXt2 |Xt1 · pXt3 |Xt2 (12)
Equations (11) and (12) give to Xt2 a role of sufficient statistic with respect
to the past of Xt but these two equations do not represent, most likely,
an adequate explanatory mechanism. For example, one's change in weight
partly depends upon one's prior weight but also upon other variables such as
diet and various psychological and biological mechanisms. However, autore-
gressive models may be useful for predictive purposes instead of explanatory
purposes. Another self-predictive temporal approach is Granger-causality,
briefly discussed in Section 2.2. Here again the model lacks an explicit ex-
planatory mechanism, though it can be useful for predictive purposes.
The econometric literature also considers distributed lag models where the
effect of a causing variable is realized according to some form of temporal
history of that variable. For instance, consider the joint distribution of 3
time-consecutive variables:
pXt−2,Xt−1,Xt = pXt−2 .pXt−1|Xt−2 .pXt|Xt−1,Xt−2 (13)
Here, a mechanism could be represented by the distribution pXt|Xt−1,Xt−2 . If
Xt−1 and Xt−2 are related, Xt−2 however confounds the effect of Xt−1 on Xt,
as Xt−2 is, in this case, a common cause of Xt−1 and Xt. Once again, an
explanatory mechanism should be proposed and tested if one wishes to use
these models for causal inference.
Another perspective on time-dependent causal models has been given by
Odd Aalen et al. (2012). In that paper, the authors discuss the issue of time
dynamics in causal modelling, from a mechanistic point of view similar to the
one taken in structural causal modelling. After having examined the problem
of association among time-dependent processes, based on the concept of local
independence (closely related to Granger-causality), the authors develop a
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dynamic path analysis approach. The latter is an extension of classical path
analysis, developed in the 1920s by Sewall Wright in population genetics,
with time-dependent variables and an outcome considered as a stochastic
process. This methodology has recourse to dynamic path diagrams, i.e. sets
of DAGs indexed by time. A more formal presentation is given in Fosen et
al. (2006), where the method is applied to a study of survival from liver
cirrhosis.
Dynamic path diagrams are time-localised, and path coefficients may
change over time, outcomes being increments (or changes over time) in a
stochastic process. Rather than time-fixing the values of the variables, the
dynamic path diagrams evolve over time giving a sequence of dynamic path
models, the set of diagrams being a stochastic process. In a nutshell, the
model relates the differential of the outcome process at each point of time t
(e.g., when data are collected) denoted by dY(t), to the covariate processes
representing the past influencing dY(t). The method is especially useful
for studying direct and indirect effects in event history and survival anal-
yses. In that paper, the approach is applied for examining the impact of
HIV-treatment, by running regressions every month since treatment start on
increments in viral loads HIV-1 RNA and CD4 cell counts (an indicator of
the reaction of the immune system), the independent variables being lagged
values of HIV-1 RNA and CD4 cell counts. Results are then compared for
the treatment group versus alternative-treatment group. Of course, this ap-
proach requires both a detailed knowledge of the evolution of the structural
model over time and a large reservoir of relevant time-dependent data. It
also assumes the absence of unmeasured confounders.
A first remark can conclude this section. In many cases, the mechanisms
active in social sciences are not measured at the exact time of occurrence.
Their measurements are given according to an aggregation over some pe-
riod of time. It is then impossible, for instance, to indicate the times ti's
mentioned in the above equations. Therefore an adequate modeling becomes
difficult or impossible. In particular, due to possible time-aggregation of
causes and outcomes, feedback effects, as illustrated by equations (2) and
(3), cannot be detected.
A second remark is that most mechanisms in social sciences are not in-
stantaneous but require a period of time. Equations (4) to (10) suggest
situations where this time-period characteristic creates substantial modeling
difficulties. In some cases, it would also be necessary to take into account the
time-pattern of the cause or of the effect over the period. For example, does
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a tax-increase on cigarettes lead to a permanent or to a temporary reduction
in smoking ?
A third remark is that mechanisms themselves may change over time,
leading not only to different parameters but also to different condition-
ing structures. For example, the determinants of fertility have drastically
changed in Europe since the nineteenth century.
6 Conclusions
As recalled at the beginning of this paper, all of our experience of the world
happens in time. Indeed, we cannot even imagine empty time (Newton-
Smith, 1986). While we have not discussed the personal, inner, dimensions
of time, the social sciences are nevertheless concerned with life events of
individuals and/or groups that happen in time. There is therefore a `histor-
ical' dimension of social phenomena that cannot prescind from a temporal
dimension.
From a methodological perspective, the question arises how to take time
into account and how to incorporate it into modeling practices. Sections 3
and 4 have surveyed the use of time in two social sciences taken as examples,
demography and economics respectively. Section 5 has presented a general
modeling framework, structural causal modeling (SCM), in which the core of
the statistical machinery is geared towards modeling explanatory mechanisms
for the phenomenon under investigation. This methodology is by design
meant to be applicable across different social science domains. The way in
which time, or rather information about the temporal order of variables, can
be incorporated into SCM prompts the following reflection.
Analytic approaches to causality tend to put the emphasis on `cause' and
`effect' as isolated factors among which a temporal order has to be estab-
lished. This is a valid empirical question, especially in cases where there is
no obvious ordering of the variables. But, in the light of how time can be
used in structural models, our suggestion is to think of the relation between
cause and effect more in terms of a process, of which we try to understand
the key points, moments, actors, etc. This is the main idea behind SCM as
presented in Section 5, in which `structure' has a meaning that goes beyond
`statistical' structure, and that instead also has to do with `explanation' or
with `explanatory mechanisms'. In turn, explanatory mechanisms are those
for which it is possible to offer a causal ordering of the variables that takes
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time into account. In other words, the causal structure is more important
than a mere temporal ordering of the variables. This is because, with due
exceptions in which the temporal order of observations corresponds to the
real temporal ordering of causes and outcomes, plausibility of a causal struc-
ture will contribute more to explaining a phenomenon than the sole temporal
ordering of variables as observed.
These considerations have lead us to discuss the role of time for the pur-
pose of causal explanation in the context of social science research. Temporal
order is important for modeling practices but it is not essential. Temporal
information is very useful to have and should be wisely used when available.
Yet, temporal information is useful only to the extent that it is placed in a
correct causal structure, and thus further corroborating the mechanism ex-
plaining the phenomenon under consideration. Finally, despite the fact that
the causal ordering of variables is more relevant for explanatory purposes
than the temporal order, the former should nevertheless take into account
the time-patterns of causes and effects, as these are often episodes rather
than events. Most of our behaviors actually extend over a period of time, be
they causes or effects. For this reason in particular, it is time to put time at
the core of our causal models.
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